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We, the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, have been
referred to as everything from a bunch of 19' century antiques on
the one hand, to the "Hippies of the Law" on the other.'
Introduction
Without the footnote, it would be impossible to tell whether the
statement above was made in 1974 or 2002. For those of us who
participated in "The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking panel on
January 5, 2002, Professor Edward Cleary's comment, made during
the 1974 Congressional hearings on the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, sounds oddly familiar-except that one generally doesn't
call them "Hippies" anymore.
As the 2001 Chair of the Evidence Section of the American
Association of Law Schools, I was responsible for organizing the
panel on "The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking." The creation and
interpretation of evidence rules is a burgeoning area for evidence
scholarship.2 It is also a timely topic, for recent changes to federal
* Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. I wish to thank the Editors
and Staff Members of the Hastings Law Journal for their excellent work on this issue and,
the Hastings Law Journal's interest in and contribution to the law of evidence. See also
Symposium, Truth and Its Rivals: Evidence Reform and the Goals of Evidence Law, 49
Hastings L.J. 289 (1998).
1. Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong. 46 (2d Sess.
1974) (statement of Prof. Edward W. Cleary, Reporter), reprinted in 10 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 2d §15, at 51 (1996 & Supp. 1996-97).
2. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After
Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 864-66 (1992); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond "Top
Down" Grand Theories of Statutory Construction: A "Bottom Up" Interpretive Approach
to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 OR. L. REv. 389 (1996); Edward J. Imwinkelried,
[843]
evidence law, such as the addition of rules on the admissibility of a
defendant's prior sexual conduct, and the amendments to the rules
regarding expert testimony, have highlighted the political and
controversial aspects of procedural rulemaking. So, taking a deep
breath, I put together a panel consisting of former members of the
Federal Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence and its most
vocal critic.' I asked them to address the following questions: who
should make the evidence rules-the judiciary, the legislature, the
executive? What role should the practicing bar, law professors and
the general public play in the creation of the rules of evidence? What
is the proper function of the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Whether The Federal Rules of Evidence Should be Conceived As a Perpetual Index Code:
Blindness is Worse than Myopia, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1595 (1999); Edward J.
Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court's Approach to the Interpretation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. REV. 267 (1993); Randolph N. Jonakait, Text,
Texts, or Ad Hoc Determinations: Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 IND.
L.J. 551 (1996); Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of
Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1717 (1995); Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the Federal Rules
of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REv.
1283 (1995); Andrew E. Taslitz, Daubert's Guide to the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Not-
So-Plain-Meaning Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 3 (1995); Andrew E. Taslitz,
Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a Politically Realistic
Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329 (1995); Glen Weissenberger, The Elusive
Identity of The Federal Rules of Evidence, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (1999); Glen
Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia: The Failure to See the Federal Rules of Evidence As a
Codification of the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1539 (1999); Glen
Weissenberger, Are the Federal Rules of Evidence a Statute?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 393 (1994);
Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307 (1992).
3. Judge Fern Smith is a Federal District Court Judge for the Northern District of
California. She served as a member of the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee from its re-inception in 1993, serving as Chair from 1996 to 1999, when she
assumed her current duties as the Director of the Federal Judicial Center. Professor
Kenneth Broun and Mr. Gregory P. Joseph also served as members of the Advisory
Committee from 1993 to 1999. Professor Broun now serves the Advisory Committee as
Consultant to the Subcommittee on Privileges. In addition to his service on the Advisory
Committee, Mr. Joseph has served as the Chair of the Litigation Section of the American
Bar Association and as the ABA advisor to the Uniform Rules of Evidence Committee of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Professor Laird
Kirkpatrick recently served as the Department of Justice representative to the Advisory
Committee and has had experience in the development of state evidence rules in Oregon.
Professor Paul Rice, who is the Director of the Evidence Project at American University,
has been a persistent critic of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee and the current
federal rulemaking process. See Paul R. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence: Tending to the Past and Pretending for the Future? 53 HASTINGS L.J. 817 (2002)
[hereinafter Rice, Advisory Committee]; Paul R. Rice & W. Delker, Federal Rules
Advisory Committee: A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 187 (2000);
Paul R. Rice, The Evidence Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence
with Supporting Commentary-Introduction, 171 F.R.D. 330 (1997).
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Committee-to codify case law, to develop rules and amendments to
respond to criticism of existing case law, or to develop solutions to
evidentiary problems unforeseen by the original drafters? Are there
special considerations that apply to evidence law that do not apply at
least to the same degree, to other civil or criminal rules of procedure?
Although some of these questions could be directed at any
procedural rulemaking process (i.e., the Civil Rules, the Criminal
Procedure Rules, the Bankruptcy Rules) and could be directed both
at state or uniform rulemaking as well as federal rulemaking, my
colleagues and I decided to focus on the Federal Rules of Evidence as
our point of departure, and allow panelists and audience members to
bring the other issues into the discussion by comparison. Part I of this
article provides the context for the panel discussion-describing the
development of the Federal Rules of Evidence to date and, in the
process, revealing the growing contentiousness surrounding the
Rules.4 Part II discusses the issues presented by the panelists as well
as the articles by the Professors Rice and Broun.
I. The Difficult Development of the Federal Rules of
Evidence
Although the current climate of evidence rulemaking seems
contentious, the Federal Rules of Evidence were troublesome from
their inception. In contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have seen their fair share of politics, their initial promulgation and
their subsequent treatment-until the 1980's-was relatively benign.'
The following history is only a brief account,6 designed both to put the
AALS Evidence Section panel in context and to illustrate the
pervasive political quality of the Evidence Rules.7
4. Unless otherwise stated, "Evidence Rules" in this Article refers to the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
5. For overviews of the recent political battles waged over the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking,
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 900-907 (1999);
Richard L. Marcus, Symposium Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects For Procedural
Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761 (1993). And certainly those involved in making the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Appellate Procedure and Bankruptcy have their
own stories to tell, but these are beyond the scope of this Article.
6. For a more thorough treatment of the history of the Evidence Rules, see 21
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 5001-5009 (1977 & Supp. 2001); 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL
M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1-8 (2002);
10 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 5-67 (1996); 1 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN, MARGARET A. BERGER, JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, at xiii-xxi (1996).
7. That is, to demonstrate once again, there is nothing new under the sun.
April 2002]
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Though the possibility and desirability of a uniform set of
Evidence Rules for use in the federal courts was recognized from the
outset of the "Golden Age" of rulemaking,8 no one was eager to
assume the task. Congress gave the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure, including rules of
evidence, in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.' Nevertheless, the
original Advisory Committee charged with drafting the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure dodged evidence issues to the degree that it could,
promulgating only two "makeshift" rules touching on evidence law-
what are now Civil Rules 43 and 44.'o In all fairness, commentators
have argued that the task of developing a body of evidence rules from
scratch was enormous, especially since there were no ready models to
examine in 1937.11 Professors Wright and Graham suggest that the
restraint shown by the original drafters of the Civil Rules may have
been a "superb stroke of practical politics," because, of the six
changes the Supreme Court made to the draft of the original Civil
Rules, three eliminated provisions dealing with evidence, thus
suggesting that the "Court was in no mood to tinker with the law of
8. See Bone, supra note 5, at 897-99 (referring to the 1950s and 1960s as "the golden
age of court rulemaking").
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 3402, 3771-72 (1988). The Enabling
Act grants the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules regarding the practice and
procedure of the federal courts, but prohibits the Court from abridging, enlarging, or
modifying any substantive right.
10. In a 1937 Note to the Supreme Court, the Civil Rules Committee stated:
The first impression of the Committee was against touching the field of evidence.
It later became clear that on account of the union of law and equity there would
be doubt as to the rules of evidence to be applied. We think it is essential to deal
with the subject at least to the extent expressed in subdivision (a) of [Civil Rule
44, now Rule 43]. Having gone that far the Committee made the further
provisions in subdivision (b) of this rule and summarized in [Civil Rule 45, now
Rule 44] the law on proof of official records now scattered through many Federal
statutes.
Advisory Committee Note, quoted in 10 MOORE, supra note 6, § 5[5], at 30. Civil Rule 43
was created to deal with admissibility of evidence, presentation of evidence through
examination and cross-examination, examination, oath or affirmation of witnesses, making
a record of excluded evidence and evidence on motions. As originally drafted, Civil Rule
43 set forth a general principle of "inclusion and, speaking broadly, tended to put
admissibility on the basis of relevancy and materiality." Id. § 6[1-3], at 36. Evidence was
admissible if the evidence would be admissible under a federal statute, under the rules of
evidence as applied in federal courts of equity, or the rules of evidence of any state court.
Id. at 36-37. If a state law excluded the evidence and no federal law admitted it, the
evidence was generally excluded. Id. at 37. Rule 44 created a rule on proving an official
record. Id. § 5[5], at 30.
11. 10 MOORE, supra note 6, § 5[1], at 14; 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, §
5002, at 40-42.
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evidence."' 2  However, by the time the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee considered the first set of amendments to the Civil Rules
in 1946, it had the American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence
to examine. Still, the Committee declined to wander into the thorny
field of evidence law reform noting that while something should be
done about the rules of evidence, some other committee ought to do
it." The original Criminal Rules Advisory Committee, promulgating
Criminal Rules that went into effect in 1946, also avoided drafting
specific rules of evidence. The Committee adopted the theory that
the federal courts would create a uniform body of evidence law in
criminal cases through the development of the common law.1
4
Professor Moore notes that, "while alluring and promising like a
spring breeze, not too much came of [this approach] due in large
measure to the fact that it is difficult to structure a rational and
comprehensive system of evidence on a case by case development."' 5
Efforts outside of the federal context to create a uniform body of
modern American evidence law were similarly troubled. From the
earliest codification efforts of Wigmore"6 to the latest draft of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, 7 the "progress" of codification of
Evidence Rules has been slow and marked more by dissension than
cohesion. In the early twentieth century, the Commonwealth Fund
Evidence Committee was formed, chaired by Edmund Morgan, and
composed of evidence scholars and judges, to reform the law of
evidence. 8 The Commonwealth Fund's report, published in 1927,
12. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5002, at 42.
13. The Chairman of the original Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Attorney-General
William D. Mitchell, stated in commenting on the original set of Civil Rules:
There was tremendous pressure brought on the advisory committee by those
familiar with the subject of evidence insisting that there was a need for reform
which we did not meet, and some advisory committee should tackle the task of
revising the rules of evidence and composing them into a new set of rules to be
promulgated by the Supreme Court.
10 MOORE, supra note 6, § 5[2], at 15. The 1946 Advisory Committee said: "While
consideration of a comprehensive and detailed set of rules of evidence seems very
desirable, it has not been feasible for the Committee so far to undertake this important
task." Id.
14. 10 MOORE, supra note 6, § 9, at 40 (noting that the Criminal Rule 26 was drafted
to allow the rules of evidence in criminal cases to develop by the common law method,
culminating in a uniform body of evidence law). The Criminal Rules were promulgated in
1944 and became effective in 1946. Id. § 9, at 41.
15. 10 MOORE, supra note 6, § 9, at 40-41.
16. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE (1910).
17. UNIFORM RULEs OF EVIDENCE (1999).
18. 21 WRIGHr & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5005, at 77 n.92. Dean Wigmore was also
a member of this group.
although resting on "spurious empiricism,"'" sounds oddly
contemporary, especially in light of developments in rules of scientific
expert testimony:
The conclusions of the Commonwealth Fund Committee can be
seen to rest on the familiar axioms of the Progressive procedural
ideology. The trial is a scientific search for truth, not a political
method of resolving disputes. As such it should be firmly under the
control of the only unbiased expert in the courtroom-the trial
judge. The role of the jury and the power of lawyers must be
curtailed, if not eliminated. Truth is the great value to which all
other forensic goals must be subordinated and the best way to
reach a true result is to admit more evidence.0
Although the proponents of the Commonwealth Fund project
attributed opposition to their report "to inertia, ignorance and sheer
perversity on the part of lawyers," their failure was, in the eyes of one
commentator, due to their refusal "to admit they were tampering with
vested interests." 21 The Commonwealth Fund project based many of
its recommendations on "empirical" evidence, which consisted of "a
totally unscientific opinion survey of practicing lawyers. ' ' 2 Many of
these lawyers, one will be shocked to learn, "responded to the
Committee's questionnaires... in terms of how they thought the
proposed rule would affect the interests of their clients. '' 3 However,
the members of the project refused to acknowledge this problem: "If
procedure was a question of competing values and interests, it was a
political problem and the dogmatic solutions of Wi g ore had no
greater claim to validity than the existing system." The only
surviving contribution of the Commonwealth Fund Evidence project
appears to be its influence on the modern business records exception
to the hearsay rule.2'
The procedural reform movement picked up speed when the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 was passed and the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee commenced drafting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In 1938, the American Bar Association Committee on
Improvements in the Law of Evidence issued its Report. This
19. Id.
20. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5005, at 79.
21. Id. at 80,81.
22. Id. at 78.
23. Id. at 80. The treatise quotes one respondent, "identified as 'a member of a
prominent firm in the south,"' who opposed a proposed rule allowing judges to comment
on the evidence: .'Juries do not convict criminals when they should, and they render
outrageous verdicts against corporations when they should not."' Id. at 80 n.10 (quoting
Commonwealth Fund questionnaire respondent).
24. Id. at 81.
25. Id. at 78.
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Committee, chaired by Wigmore, openly acknowledged that "changes
in the law of evidence are sought or opposed on the basis of economic
self-interest" but condemned such legislation as "injurious to the
whole morale of the system., 26  Wigmore's Committee, however,
continued to view itself as a nonideological body of experts on
evidence law.' The ABA Committee ultimately endorsed many of
the proposals of the Commonwealth Fund Report, but added a wide
range of new proposals, such as restricting the law of privileges and
protecting the interests of witnesses.'
In 1939, the American Law Institute began work on its project to
create a Model Code of Evidence. Professor Edmund Morgan of
Harvard was appointed Reporter; Dean Wigmore had to be content
with the title of "Chief Consultant." The in-fighting began almost at
once, with the primary battle being whether the Code should be a
very brief set of rules, such as those favored by Judge Charles E.
Clark, the primary draftsman of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
or the very detailed (over five hundred pages) evidence code,
advocated by Dean Wigmore. Professor Morgan offered a
compromise between these extremes, which ultimately prevailed with
the membership of the ALI in 1940.29 However, when the Model
Code was finally published in 1942, the opposition became loud and
fierce, led by Dean Wigmore who criticized the discretion the Model
Code gave to trial judges and complained that the Model Code did
not address all the areas of evidence law (as his code would have),
raising the problem of whether the common law aspects of evidence
law that were not included would still exist or had been repealed by
implication.3" A committee of the California Bar Association said
that the Code sought "'to destroy the foundation u on which our
structure for the administration of justice is founded.' The common
explanation for the failure of the Model Code is the degree of
discretion put into the hands of the trial judge.32 However, Professors
Wright and Graham suggest an additional explanation, focusing on
the poor salesmanship of the Reporter Morgan:
Most lawyers were probably scared to death by a series of articles
in the American Bar Association Journal by Professor Morgan,
26. Id.
27. Id. at 83 n.30.
28. Id. at 83.
29. Id. at 85-86.
30. John H. Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent,
28 A.B.A. J. 23 (1942).
31. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAm, supra note 6, §5005, at 89 (quoting Report of Committee
on Administration of Justice on Model Code of Evidence, 19 CAL. ST. B.J. 262,281 (1944)).
32. Id. at 88.
which were revised and published as a Foreward to the Model
Code. What Morgan did was to make vividly explicit those aspects
of the Progressive value-system that had only been hinted at by
earlier writers.... Morgan not only refused to state what the
Model Code did in terms that would have been more palatable, he
stated aspirations for further reform that were well calculated to
curl the hair of even moderate lawyers. For example, he pondered
the fate of the attorney-client privilege in terms that suggested its
ultimate abolition. Arguments in support of the other privileges
were dismissed as "mere sentiment" and "rhetoric" while the
privileges of the government were strengthened. It is not surprising
that in 1942 many lawyers regarded this blunt statement of
Progressive values as fascistic, or worse. 3
Professor Ariens argues that the Model Code failed for an
additional reason: Professor Morgan's "explicit disavowal of truth as
the goal of the American system of adjudication."'  While Dean
Wigmore remained true to the Progressivist belief that the
improvement of evidence law would lead to trials that could reveal
the truth, Professor Morgan moved toward a legal realist position:
"Morgan's view... was, 'A lawsuit is not a means of making a
scientific investigation for the ascertainment of truth; it is a
proceeding for the orderly settlement of a controversy between
litigants."' Professor Ariens argues that Professor Morgan chose "a
middle ground between the 'truth' theory of Dean Wigmore and
those who concluded that the trial was irrational," just a battle
between litigants, with the result going to the stronger.36 According to
Professor Ariens, this middle-of-the-road position, along with its
corollary that a trial was not just a rational performance, plus the
reasons advanced by Professors Wright and Graham, resulted in the
failure of the Model Code-not a single state adopted it27 In 1951,
Professor Morgan, sounding somewhat bewildered, pondered how his
Model Code could possibly have failed:
It might have been supposed that proposal sponsored by a body
which is composed of representative judges, lawyers, and law
teachers would meet with general approval, especially in view of
the standing of the lawyers and judges who compose its Council,
33. Id. at 86-87. The treatise also suggests that the Model Code failed because of
perceptions that it reflected an East Coast elitist bias. Id.
34. Michael Ariens, Progress Is Our Only Product: Legal Reform and the Codification
of Evidence, 17 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 213,222-23 (1992).
35. Id. at 235 (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, The Code of Evidence Proposed by the
American Law Institute, 27 A.B.A.J. 539,539 (1941)).
36. Id. at 236.
37. Id. at 244.
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and who are responsible for proposals put to the Assembly, and
whose work is subject to a veto by the Assembly.'
But Professor Morgan failed to calculate, as many academic
lawyers do, the inherently conservative nature of the judiciary and the
bar. His "radical" reform of the law of evidence was, at least in terms
of structure, not so terribly "radical" but was well before its time.
The Model Code of Evidence, however, did become the basis for
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws'
("NCCUSL") efforts to draft a body of Uniform State Laws on
Evidence, beginning in 1949." However, the NCCUSL redirected
the goals of this code to "acceptability and uniformity" rather than
"reform." Not surprisingly, the Uniform Rules, which were passed
by the NCCUSL in 1953, ' failed to excite the imagination of
jurisdictions seeking to codify their evidence law. Only Kansas, New
Jersey and Utah adopted the 1953 version of the Uniform Rules:42
Elsewhere the reformers encountered the Catch-22 first devised in
the campaign against the Model Code. If the rules were advocated
because they would change the law, then opponents would object
to the changes; if the reformers insisted the Rules simply restated
the existing law, the other side replied: "then who needs them?"
The idea that enactment of the Rules would bring uniformity
among the various states may have appealed to teachers at national
law schools and lawyers at large law firms, but the average lawyer
could not care less what the law was on the other side of the state
line. Thus, the advocates of the Uniform Rules hoped that the
Supreme Court would adopt them for use in the federal courts.
Then it would be possible to argue that the states should adopt
them so local lawyers did not have to learn two sets of rules, i.e., the
argument would be intra-state rather than inter-state uniformity.43
It is difficult to measure to the success of subsequent revisions of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence because until very recently the
Uniform Rules have essentially followed the Federal Rules of
Evidence. In 1974, a new set of Uniform Rules were promulgated,
patterned after the draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence then under
consideration in the House of Representatives; the Uniform Rules
were updated in 1986 to incorporate the changes in the Federal
38. Edmund M. Morgan, The Future of the Law of Evidence, 29 TEX. L. REv. 587,598
(1951).
39. Ariens, supra note 34, at 245.
40. Id. at 246. The motto of the drafters of the Uniform Rules seemed to be "sensible
change without shock." Spencer A. Guard, The Uniform Rules of Evidence, 31 TuL. L.
REV. 19, 23 (1956), quoted in Ariens, supra note 34, at 246 n.200.
41. Ariens, supra note 34, at 246.
42. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5005, at 91-92.
43. 1d at 92.
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Rules.' Thus, although technically thirty-nine states and Puerto Rico
have adopted the Uniform Rules, they have followed the Federal
Rules of Evidence.45 The 1999 version of the Uniform Rules,
however, does differ from the Federal Rules in significant ways.46
Although the 1953 Uniform Rules posed one possibility for the
codification of evidence law reform, the eyes of the scholarly
community and the bar remained fixed on the Supreme Court and the
possibility that it would promulgate a uniform set of Federal
Evidence Rules. However, the Supreme Court did not exactly jump
at the first opportunity to do so. Instead, in 1961, the Judicial
Conference of the United States approved the appointment of a
Special Committee on Evidence to prepare a report on the
advisability and feasibility of developing uniform rules of evidence for
the federal courts.47  Two years later, the Special Committee
submitted its final report to the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference, and, not
surprisingly, concluded that it was both feasible and desirable to
promulgate uniform federal rules of evidence.' The Judicial
Conference approved the report and adopted the Standing
Committee's recommendation that "an advisory committee on rules
of evidence be appointed by the Chief Justice, consisting of
approximately 15 members broadly representative of all segments on
44. Id. § 5005, at 2 (Supp. 2001).
45. UNiF. LAWS ANNOTATED, UNIF. RULES OF EVIDENCE, TABLE OF
JURISDICTIONS WHEREIN RULES HAVE BEEN ADOPTED (West 2001).
46. C. Arlen Beam, Symposium: The Uniform Rules of Evidence: Introduction,
Background, and Overview, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 443, 444 (2001) (the Drafting Committee
established in 1995 was given a new charge: "the assignment was to conduct a
comprehensive review and revision of the Uniform Rules without any controlling
reference to the language in the Federal Rules"). One of the most significant differences
in the 1999 Uniform Rules is the rejection of the rules regarding the prior sexual conduct
of criminal defendants under Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415.
47. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5006, at 92-93. The report produced by
the Special Committee is generally referred to as the first Advisability and Feasibility
Study. Professors Wright and Graham note that the Special Committee's work appears to
have been unnecessary, since the Judicial Conference had already approved the concept of
promulgating federal rules of evidence. Moreover, the Chair, Professor James William
Moore, and the Reporter, Professor Thomas F. Green, Jr., of the Special Committee had
already clearly stated their views that federal rules were both desirable and feasible. Id at
93. The authors speculate that "Perhaps the Special Committee mechanism was designed
as a trial balloon to test professional reaction to the idea before the difficult work of
drafting rules was begun." Id.
48. Id. at 97.
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the profession, with special emphasis on trial lawyers and trial
judges."49
Chief Justice Earl Warren took almost two years to put the
Advisory Committee together, finally appointing Albert E. Jenner, Jr.
as Chairman, and Professor Edward W. Cleary as Reporter!"
Professors Wright and Graham point out that, despite being "drawn
from all parts of the country" and being "carefully balanced in terms
of litigation speciality-prosecutor and criminal defense lawyer,
personal injury lawyer and insurance company lawyer, big city lawyer
and small town lawyer," it was an essentially conservative group-
one, quoting Chairman Jenner, not "inclined to give the family jewels
away or tip or rock the laws of evidence."'"
The Preliminary Draft of the rules was created in three-and-one-
half-years, with the bulk of the work performed by Professor Cleary.
The Advisory Committee produced a Revised Draft in 1970, based on
the comments and suggestions it received on the Preliminary Draft.'
The Judicial Conference approved the Revised Draft and sent it to
the Supreme Court for the rules to be promulgated in accordance
with the Rules Enabling Act. "It was then that the Supreme Court
made the fateful decision," Professors Wright and Graham suggest;
instead of sending the rules on to Congress, the Supreme Court sent
the Revised Draft back to the Judicial Conference in 1971, to be
published for comment before being officially promulgated.53
It sought comment and comment it received. The first warning
shot from Congress came in August, 1971, from the Senate, where
seven "conservative" Senators introduced a bill to restrict the
Supreme Court's rulemaking power, apparently in response to several
provisions dealing with the prosecution of criminal cases.' The
objections continued to mount from the Department of Justice as it
pressed for change after change in the Revised Draft-a majority of
the changes were implemented. 5  On November 20, 1972, the
Supreme Court approved the Evidence Rules and authorized the
Chief Justice to transmit them to Congress, but over the dissent of
49. Id. at 98 (quoting U.S. Jud. Conf. Report of Proceedings (March 11-12, 1963), at
20).
50. The original Evidence Rules Advisory Committee, including its Chair and
Reporter, consisted of nine lawyers (all identified as "trial lawyers" except for the Chief of
the Appeals and Research Section of the Criminal Division of the United States
Department of Justice), four law professors and three federal judges (two district court
judges and one appellate court judge). Id at 98 n.27.
51. Id. at 99 (quoting testimony of Chairman Albert E. Jenner).
52. Id. at 100-101.
53. Id. at 101. The Revised Draft was published at 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
54. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5006, at 102.
55. Id. at 102-104.
Justice Douglas, who arkued that the substance of the rules violated
the Rules Enabling Act.
Timing, they say, is everything, and 1972 was not a good year for
Congress to be considering the newly promulgated Federal Rules of
Evidence. The Watergate scandal unfolded, with President Nixon
asserting broad executive privilege at the same time Congress was
considering the proposed Evidence Rules which contained proposals
for expanded governmental privileges. 7 Moreover, the concessions
made in the Revised Draft to appease the Justice Department began
to draw unfavorable attention from members of Congress who were
discovering misconduct by members of that Department. 8 Potential
problems caused by the interference of the Justice Department in the
Rules Enabling Act was avoided when Congress enacted a statute
that provided that the Evidence Rules could not take effect until they
were expressly approved by Congress. 9 The focus then turned to the
content of proposed rules, particularly the proposed rules of privilege,
which were the subject of intense lobbying.6' After several
modifications,6 Congress enacted the Rules, and President Ford
signed them into law on January 3, 1975.62 For a topic that has the
driest of connotations, the process and politics of making the Federal
Rules of Evidence was anything but dull.
Shortly after the Rules went into effect, Professor Friedenthal
predicted that Congress' active role in the creation of those Rules
"may have spelled the end of the autonomous role held by the
Supreme Court for the past 40 years."6'  Professor Friedenthal's
prediction has come true. Since 1974, the process of promulgating
changes to federal procedural rules has become increasingly removed
from the judicial sphere and into the hurly-burly of the political
process.
Following submission of the proposed rules to Congress, the
Supreme Court disbanded the Advisory Committee on Evidence.:
Despite numerous calls to reconstitute the Evidence Advisory
56. Id. at 104.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 104, 106.
59. Act of Mar. 30,1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973).
60. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, at 106-107.
61. The House and Senate each passed different versions of the rules. A Conference
Committee produced the final version.
62. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595,93d 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (effective date July
1,1975).
63. Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A
Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673,682-85 (1975).
64. Judicial Conference of the United States, Subcomm. on Long Range Planning, A
Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking, 168 F.R.D. 679,686 (1996).
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Committee,5 the Advisory Committee was not reestablished until
1992. Two years after it was reestablished, the Committee published
a "Special Request For Comments On Certain Federal Rules of
Evidence."'  The Advisory Committee announced that it had
engaged in "a comprehensive review of all of the Evidence Rules, and
it has now completed an initial assessment of a substantial number of
the rules" and had decided not to amend twenty-five of the Rules.6
Since the Evidence Rules were adopted in 1975, the following
substantive changes have been made to the rules: Rule 103 has been
amended once (2000); Rule 404 has been amended twice (1991 and
2000); Rule 407 has been amended once (1997); Rule 410 has been
amended once (1975) and then completely revised (1980); Rule 412
was added (1978) and amended twice (1988, 1994); Rules 413-415
were added (1995); Rule 609 was amended once (1990); Rule 701 was
amended once (2000); Rule 702 was amended once (2000); Rule 703
was amended once (2000); Rule 704 was amended once (1984); Rule
705 was amended once (1993); Rule 801(d)(2) was amended once
(1997); Rule 803(6) was amended once (2000); Rule 804(b)(6) was
added (1997); Rule 807 was adopted to replace both Rules 803(24)
and 804(b)(5) (1997); Rules 902(11) and 902(12) were added (2000);
and all of the Rules were examined and altered, where necessary, to
be gender-neutral (1987), but some of them had to be corrected again
the following year for clarification."
The most controversial of the recent Evidence Rule changes was
the addition of Rules 413-415,69 which allow the admission of certain
evidence of defendant's past sexual conduct for any purpose, in sexual
assault and child sexual abuse criminal cases and in civil cases growing
out of such criminal acts. These rules were enacted as part of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,0 but
65. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After
Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, The Need For An Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions For Selective Revision of the Rules,
142 F.R.D. 519, 521-24 (1992) (detailing several efforts to re-establish an Evidence
Advisory Committee).
66. Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposal Rules: Proposed Amendments
to Federal Rules, 156 F.R.D. 339,484 (1994).
67. Id.
68. The dates in parentheses indicate the effective date of the amendments. See also
21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5008 (Supp. 2001) (partial list of amendments).
69. Runner-up for most controversial rule proposal would go to the revision of the
rules regarding expert testimony. FED. R. EVID. 702-703. Several pieces of legislation
were introduced on this issue, but were not successful. The Congressional efforts were
suspended when the Evidence Advisory Committee took over the project.
70. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
320935, 108 Stat. 1796,2135-37 (1994).
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similar proposals had been floating around the Department of Justice
for some time.7" As enacted, the Violent Crime Control bill contained
a provision that the effective date of Rules 413-415 would be delayed
to give the Judicial Conference a chance to respond to those rules.
The Judicial Conference issued a forceful-and negative-response
to Rules 413-415.72 The Judicial Conference urged Congress to reject
the changes or, at a minimum, allow judges more flexibility to exclude
this evidence. The American Bar Association House of Delegates
also passed a resolution opposing Rules 413-415.73  Nevertheless,
Congress did not act on these recommendations. Rules 413-415 took
effect as initially enacted.74
As the history of the Evidence Rules shows, they have been a
continual source of controversy since their inception. But what is also
telling are the themes running throughout the story of efforts to
create a uniform body of evidence law: the deep desire for stability
and powerful resistance to change; the need for clarity but the desire
for flexibility; the power of judges versus the power of legislators.
And sometimes, a deep suspicion or skepticism about the role of
academics in the rulemaking process. The next section of this article
reveals these themes within the 2002 AALS Evidence Section panel
and the articles by Professors Broun and Rice.
H. Current Problems in Federal [Evidence] Rulemaking
Given the contentious history of the Evidence Rules, it is not
surprising that the panelists disagreed on a number of points. This
part of the article analyzes several of those points of contention.
A. Professor Paul Rice: Are the Federal Rules of Evidence Rules Really
Broken?
Professor Rice expresses his exasperation with the attitude of the
Evidence Rules Advisory Committee, as he perceives it, summarized
as "if it ain't broke, don't fix it."75  Professor Rice is undeniably
correct when he asserts that there is a growing body of case law that
71. See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases
and Other Cases, 70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 15, 24-26 (1994) (defending Rules 413-415).
72. Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Judicial Conference of the
United States on the Admission of Character Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct
Cases (1995), reprinted in 56 CRiM. L. REP. (BNA) No. 19, at 2140 (Feb. 15, 1995).
73. See Myrna S. Raeder, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Report to
the House of Delegates, reprinted in 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343 (1995).
74. See generally Perspectives on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 265 (1995).
75. Rice, Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 823.
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diverges from or even contradicts the text of the Federal Rules. 6
Even the current Reporter to the Evidence Rules Advisory
Committee, Professor Daniel J. Capra, identifies over twenty-one
different instances where federal case law contradicts the text of an
Evidence Rule and eleven instances where federal courts have
developed common law rules of evidence when the Evidence Rules
are silent.' Thus, one question is whether this is conclusive evidence
that the Evidence Rules are "busted?" The second question is
assuming that these instances of divergence are proof that the
Evidence Rules need fixing, who has responsibility for fixing them-
the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, the Supreme
Court, Congress? Or, looking at it from Professor Rice's perspective,
who is to blame for not fixing them?
Are the Evidence Rules "broken?" Professor Rice, both here
and in his previous articles,78 makes a good argument that there are
several rules that could stand clarification or outright change.
However, some of his examples are better than others. By "better," I
mean "practical"--in the sense that the proposals would both cure
the problems identified and that the proposals might actually be
implemented-either through the Rules Enabling Act Committee
process or directly, by Congress.
At one end of the spectrum, for example, Professor Rice makes a
sensible suggestion that Rule 602 should be amended, applying the
requirement of "personal knowledge" to the hearsay exemption for
the vicarious admissions of agents under Rule 801(d)(2)." Some
members of the Department of Justice undoubtedly would oppose
such an amendment, because it might preclude prosecutors from
using some statements of unnamed, unindicted co-conspirators, unless
the prosecution could show a basis for the declarant's knowledge of
the facts stated. But would it be so outrageous to require prosecutors
to present testimony from a declarant who has first-hand knowledge
of what he or she is talking about? This kind of suggestion for change
76. Id.
77. Daniel J. Capra, Case Law Divergence from the Federal Rules of Evidence, 197
F.R.D. 531, 532 (2000), available at www.jjc.gov [hereinafter Capra, Case Law
Divergence].
78. Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee: A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678 (2000); Paul R.
Rice, The Evidence Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 171
F.R.D. 330 (1997) [hereinafter Rice, The Evidence Project].
79. Rice, Advisory Committee, supra note 3.
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at least does deserve serious discussion and consideration, which is
the central goal of Professor Rice's Evidence Project.'
Some of Professor Rice's other suggestions are at the opposite
end of the spectrum of practicality. For example, it is probably not a
matter of major significance that the hearsay exceptions for "ancient
documents""1 and "forfeiture by wrongdoing"'  are categorized under
Rules 803 and 804, rather than categorized as nonhearsay in Rule
801(d).' It is true that the ostensible rationale for exceptions under
Rules 803 and 804 is, at least in part, based on reliability. It is also
true that the decision to admit hearsay as "ancient documents" or
due to "forfeiture by wrongdoing" is not primarily based on the
reliability of those statements. However, many of the 803 and 804
exceptions have dubious reliability rationales,84 but have nonetheless
become commonly and widely accepted as workable solutions to
recurring evidentiary problems. Until more of our evidentiary
empiricists obtain funding and design reality-based research projects,
the root of the real problem-the lack of reliability of many types of
hearsay-will go unchallenged. Until there is better evidence to
80. Rice, The Evidence Project, supra note 78, at 7 ("a broad and vigorous debate is
fundamental to the continued vitality" of the Rules of Evidence).
81. FED. R. EVID. 803(16). Actually, an even greater problem with the "ancient
documents" rule is its title. It is always good for a cheap laugh to point out to students
that by the measure of this rule, which creates a hearsay exception for documents older
than twenty years, they are all "ancient." Although I take less delight in this joke the
older I get, I would fiercely oppose an amendment to this rule on the grounds that I'd run
short of stand-up material.
82. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). Rule 804 exceptions are driven primarily by necessity
concerns rather than reliability concerns. As a threshold matter, the declarant must be
"unavailable" as defined by Rule 804(a), for any of the Rule 804 exceptions to apply.
83. Rice, Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 820 n.9.
84. The reliability rationale for "excited utterances," Rule 803(1), would be laughable,
if it were not for the serious problem that such evidence is commonly admitted under this
exception in criminal cases, despite the obvious potential defects with the declarant's
ability to perceive, recall, and communicate correctly. And of course, there is no longer a
federal confrontation clause issue in these cases, since the United States Supreme Court
has conflated that issue with the evidentiary concerns of reliability, making the
constitutional language superfluous. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354-56 (1992)
("excited utterances" constitute reliable hearsay because they fall under a "firmly rooted
hearsay exception"); Eleanor Swift, Smoke and Mirrors: The Failure of the Supreme
Court's Accuracy Rationale in White v. Illinois Requires A New Look at Confrontation, 22
CAP. U.L. REV. 145, 154 n.38 (1993) (collecting social science research discrediting the
reliability of "excited utterances"); Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of
Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV.
623 (1993) (discussing the limited utility of the reliability or evidentiary dimension of
Confrontation Clause analysis). Now that's a real problem.
85. For recent scholarship applying heavily theoretical approach to evidence law, see
Symposium, New Perspectives on Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491 (2001).
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counter the pull of the "wisdom" of tradition, there simply is no
reason to believe the Advisory Committee can change the tide.
Finally, many, if not most, of Professor Rice's Evidence Project
suggestions, could be placed more in the middle of the spectrum of
practicality. These suggestions may have some merit, but ignore the
political and practical implications of the amendments. For example,
Professor Rice suggests an amendment to Rule 704(b) to clarify its
application. Rule 704(b) is commonly referred to as "The Hinckley
Amendment" because it was passed by Congress as part of the
Insanity Defense Reform Acte shortly after John Hinckley, Jr. was
found not guilty by reason of insanity in his criminal trial for shooting
President Ronald Reagan, Press Secretary James Brady, and two
others. Rule 704(b) expressly precludes experts from testifying that a
criminal defendant had a particular mental state necessary to commit
a crime or which constitutes a defense!' However, as Professor Rice
notes, the drafting of Rule 704(b) is ambiguous. Who is encompassed
by the term "experts?" Professor Rice wonders whether lay witnesses
are also prevented from testifying on a criminal defendant's mental
state, although lay witnesses are not expressly mentioned in Rule
704(b).' Other commentators agree with Professor Rice that Rule
704(b) is poorly drafted, but differ as to the nature of the ambiguity,
concluding that the real problem is whether the rule was intended to
constrain only mental health experts. One of these commentators is
Professor Dan Capra, the current Reporter to the Evidence Rules
Advisory Committee and one of Professor Rice's targets.,9 Professor
Capra has pointed out the difficulty the courts have had applying
Rule 704(b) in cases where law enforcement experts will testify that a
criminal defendant possessed narcotics with intent to distribute them
rather than for personal use." As Professor Capra and others have
86. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1984).
87. FED. R. EVID. 704(b) provides:
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are
matters for the trier of fact alone.
88. Rice, Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 820 n.9.
89. 1& at 839, 842 n. 61.
90. Capra, Case Law Divergence, supra note 77, at 8 (citing United States v.
Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 587-88 (4th Cir. 1994) (Rule 704(b) does not apply to bar the
testimony of an expert law enforcement agent)); United States v. Williams, 980 F.2d 1463,
1466 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (allowing the prosecution to avoid the Rule 704(b) problem by
having the law enforcement expert testify about the intent of a hypothetical defendant,
matching the facts of the actual case). See also Dana R. Hassin, Note, How Much is Too
Much? Rule 704(b) Opinions on Personal Use v. Intent to Distribute, 55 U. MIAMI L. Rev.
pointed out, there are really two problems with Rule 704(b), its
application beyond mental health experts and, more seriously, that
the Rule "'requires the jury, as the finder of fact, to reach a
conclusion as to the defendant's mental state without the benefit of
the most useful testimony the expert could offer."' 9' These concerns
seem far more serious than Professor Rice's concern over lay
witnesses testifying on a criminal defendant's mental state; many trial
judges would exclude lay witness testimony on the mental condition
of a criminal defendant as beyond the personal knowledge of a lay
person.' In his larger work, The Evidence Project, Professor Rice and
his associates do note the problem of law enforcement expert
testimony on criminal intent that Professor Capra discusses but the
Evidence Project's solution is just to eliminate Rule 704(b) because:
The Hinckley amendment to current Rule 704(b) was an over-
reactive, ill- conceived, political response to what some might find
an embarrassing moment in our criminal jurisprudence. The
solution to that problem lay in judicial restrictions on the
presentation of psychiatric testimony, not the resuscitation of an
outmoded common law doctrine that was never fully understood or
consistently applied. Accordingly, Revised Rule 704 abolishes
subsection (b)-returning the Rule to its original content.94
Professor Rice's "solution" overlooks the fact that this provision
was promulgated and added directly by Congress, by-passing the
Court's rulemaking process.' How realistic is it that the Federal
Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee, even if supported by the
Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference and the United States
Supreme Court, could effectively tell Congress to go where the sun
never shines? Professor Rice appears to have forgotten that under
the rulemaking process his revisions would be required to follow,
Congress has the final word.
A similar criticism about the lack of sensitivity to political and
practical considerations can be leveled at the Evidence Project's
suggestion that Rules 413-415, admitting a criminal defendant's prior
667, 667 (2001) ("It is not altogether clear that Rule 704(b) was meant to apply beyond
mental health experts.").
91. Daniel J. Capra, A Recipe for Confusion: Congress and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 55 U. MIAMI L. REv. 691, 694 (2001) [hereinafter Capra, Congress and the
Federal Rules of Evidence] (quoting Hassin, supra note 90, at 671).
92. FED. R. EVID. 602,701.
93. Rice, The Evidence Project, supra note 78, at 592-94.
94. Id. at 361.
95. See Hassin, supra note 90, at 670 n.18 ("Note that [Rule 704(b)] was initially
adopted by Congress with the Advisory Committee only being given the right to
comment." (referencing Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
2057)).
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sexual conduct in cases of child sexual abuse or rape, simply be
eliminated:
The new character evidence rules, Current Rules 413-15, are
without precedent. They were enacted over the express
disapproval of the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee,
without empirical evidence of the enhanced reliability of this type
of character evidence over other similar character evidence for
which no specific rules have been enacted, and without
demonstrated need in light of existing rules and practices. Current
Rules 413-15 have been deleted, leaving the admissibility of all
predisposition evidence on the question of guilt to the character
evidence provisions of Revised Rules 404 and 405.9
This is all true. Moreover, there is more sustained and
thoughtful criticism of Rules 413-415 in the Evidence Project's
discussion of proposed revisions to Article Four of the Evidence
RulesY Nevertheless, these kinds of arguments "stink of the lamp" of
impractical legal scholarship. If all the logical, legal arguments and,
perhaps more important, the persuasive power of the credibility of
the Advisory Committee and the Judicial Conference could not stop
Congress from directly passing Rules 413-415, how can we conclude
that Congress would "overlook" an effort to eliminate those rules?
Although the exact composition of Congress will always change, there
is no basis for concluding that Congress would be receptive to
eliminating a provision intended to get tough on crime. Defendants
who are accused of heinous crimes have a poor lobby in Washington.
Thus, this is not just a critique of the substance of the Evidence
Project's proposals; it is a critique of the method in which the
Evidence Rules are made and amended-the essence of Professor
Rice's argument here and in his earlier critique of the Federal Rules
of Evidence Advisory Committee.9 s
Eliminating rules passed directly by Congress, such as Rule
704(b) or Rules 413-415, is an impractical and impolitic suggestion.
There are, however, ways of working through the problem. These
methods may not be perfect. They may not eliminate all problems.
They will not satisfy all the critics. But they are pragmatic and
politically sensitive. For example, Professor Capra suggests that the
problem of Rule 704(b) be handled by an amendment that would
limit its application to "mental health" experts, while acknowledging
that the Rule will still exclude potentially helpful expert testimony.
In other words, the problem of overbreadth is solved, but the Rule
96. Rice, The Evidence Project, supra note 78, at 364.
97. Id at 473-90.
98. Rice, Advisory Committee, supra note 3; Rice & Delker, supra note 3.
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still prevents the trier of fact from hearing potentially helpful
testimony.' Professor Capra argues:
The reason this proposal is more "politically" palatable is because it
can be pitched as an amendment that restores Rule 704(b) to its
originally intended scope, i.e., as a limit on psychiatric testimony
such as that in the Hinckley case. As such, it is not such a slap in
the face of Congress. It can even be pitched as correcting the
courts' misinterpretation of what Congress must have, in its infinite
wisdom, intended."°
Here, Professor Capra illustrates the problem of the practical
evidence scholar, that is, one who would like to see his or her
scholarship actually implemented. Professor Capra cannot afford the
luxury of pure theorizing; he has to think about what can be
"pitched." Moreover, as Reporter to the Advisory Committee, he has
role constraints, ones that he has discussed candidly:
I am only the Reporter; I can't get the Advisory Committee to do
anything. Issues for the Committee are generated by suggestions
from judges, lawyers, and academics, and from the Advisory
Committee members themselves. The Reporter's role is to assist
the Committee with background research, to provide drafting
alternatives, and to prepare the Advisory Committee Note.
Reporters who conceive themselves as members of the Committee
they serve usually do not serve very long.
We have no reason to doubt Professor Capra's view of his role.
Nonetheless, I understand Professor Rice's frustration with Professor
Capra's perspective. He would like to see the Reporter, and the rest
of the members of the Advisory Committee, exercise influence and
leadership to correct and strengthen the Evidence Rules. However,
as Professor Capra can testify, Professor Rice is barking up the wrong
tree. When change is viewed as necessary, the influence and
leadership will have to come from the top-the Judicial Conference,
the Supreme Court and those members of Congress who will listen to
them.
I admire the amount of research and analysis Professor Rice and
the other members of his Evidence Project have done, but sometimes
it is more effective to pick one's battles than to try a full frontal
assault, especially where one has an uphill fight with an inherently
cautious judiciary making the key decisions on which rules to change.
It is somewhat maddening to hear the circularity of the arguments.
Professor Rice argues that changes to the rules through the
rulemaking process are impossible unless the Advisory Committee is
99. Capra, Congress and the Federal Rules of Evidence, supra note 91, at 702.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 701-02.
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willing to begin the process. The former Advisory Committee
members point out that it is senseless to begin a change that will not
be approved by the Judicial Conference."° Professor Rice responds
that there is no hope of a change unless the Advisory Committee tries
to push for change with the Judicial Conference. Students of rhetoric
know that when you want someone to take action, but that person
just digs deeper in place, it is time for a new strategy.'0
102. As Judge Fern Smith pointed out, there are actually three judicial hurdles for the
Advisory Committee, even when they agree that a rule change is essential-the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference, the Judicial
Conference and the Supreme Court. Transcript, Symposium, The Politics of [Evidence]
Rulemaking, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 733,738 (2002).
103. Any Minnesotan understands this problem as the "stuck in the snowbank"
scenario. If your car is stuck in a snowbank, you only hurt yourself by hitting (or
"gunning") hard on the gas pedal. You hear a terrible whine as you sink your car deeper
and deeper into whatever rut you are in. The best way to deal with the problem is to get
out of the car and provide some additional traction under the wheel in the rut-a blanket,
sand, kitty litter (yes, people do use it) whatever you can find that might work. Then, back
in the car, gently "rock" the car by slowly and cautiously alternating between gentle surges
on the gas pedal. Soon you will nudge yourself out of the snowbank. If there are other
Minnesotans around, you can ask them to help rock the car out of the rut. You must still
be gentle with the gas pedal, or you will spew dirty snow in the faces of your helpers. It is
good to enlist help; you might be freed faster than if you work alone. I'm certain that this
parable is clear without further explanation.
There is an odd link, actually, between the state of Minnesota and the law of
evidence. Some of the greatest evidence scholars and teachers have Minnesota ties.
Edmund M. Morgan, a member of the original Civil Rules Advisory Committee and the
Reporter to the ALI Model Rules of Evidence project practiced law in Duluth, Minnesota
for seven years before joining the Law Faculty at the University of Minnesota. See Mason
Ladd, Edmund M. Morgan-In Memoriam, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1546 (1966). Other
evidence "greats" who have taught at the University of Minnesota include Ronan Degnan,
Arthur Miller, Roger C. Park, Maynard Pirsig and Charles Alan Wright. Professor Daniel
J. Capra, the current Reporter to the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee,
grew up in Minnesota, as did Gregory P. Joseph, evidence scholar, litigator and former
member of the Advisory Committee. The link becomes even stranger if one considers
Minnesota as part of a "Midwestern School of Evidence:" John Henry Wigmore
(WIGMORE'S CODE OF EVIDENCE; Dean, Northwestern University Law School); James
William Moore (MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE; Chair of the 1961 Study of Federal
Evidence Rules Advisability and Feasibility Study; J.D. University of Chicago); Professor
Edward Cleary (Reporter, Original Federal Rules Advisory Committee; University of
Illinois); and Professor Mason Ladd (Professor, University of Iowa Law School).
Professor Michael Ariens has traced the linkage between legal Progressivism
(characterized by the values of efficiency, expertise and progress) and the development of
evidence rules. Ariens, supra note 34, at 222-23. See also 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 6, § 5005, at 77-89 (tracing the Progressivist roots of the ALI Model Code). It would
be an interesting project to trace the influence of Progressivism, which had its roots in the
Midwest, on the work of these evidence scholars. Then again, there could just be
something in the water.
Professor Rice, while understandably frustrated by his inability
to persuade the Advisory Committee of the need for change, turned
to Congress for the solutions to these evidentiary problems but
believes that he was frustrated there by Congress's lack of interest in
the rulemaking process. °4 However, as the discussion of Rule 704(b)
and Rules 413-415 demonstrate, the problem is not Congress's lack of
interest in rulemaking. Congress clearly has an interest in the
evidence rules when it suits a political constituency. 5 Indeed, the
essential problem with Congressional involvement in rulemaking is
that the judicial branch does not appear to have the influence it ought
to have with Congress on the subject of federal rules of practice and
procedure, as it does with the rules of evidence.
Professor Robert Bone has examined similar problems with the
rulemaking process from the perspective of the Civil Rules. Using
research on public choice theory, he argued that the legislative
process makes it an especially difficult place for procedural
rulemaking:
In public choice theory, legislators further their own self-interest
and respond to interest groups insofar as those groups make
credible promises or threats to reward or punish, such as promising
campaign support or threatening to support opponents. Interest
groups have conflicting interests, however, and one common way
legislators manage the conflict is through logrolling. The typical
logrolling scenario involves a deal between two legislators, each
eager for the other to support a project that benefits politically
powerful constituents.
Logrolling is not necessarily inefficient, but it becomes so when
collective action problems prevent some interested groups from
organizing and thus participating in the legislative bargain. Under
those circumstances, externalities often plague policy decisions,
because organized groups with political power have incentives to
secure legislation that benefits themselves at the expense of
unorganized and less powerful groups."~
Professor Bone notes that the kind of constituencies involved in
procedural rulemaking are the most susceptible to the problems
presented by the legislative process:
For example, plaintiffs have strong interests in procedure, but they
are extremely difficult to organize. Transaction costs and free-rider
104. Transcript, supra note 102, at 741-42.
105. Another recent example of Congressional "interest" in rulemaking has been
Congressional efforts to amend Rule 702 on expert testimony. In one of the few recent
victories for the Rules Committee process, these Congressional efforts were headed off, at
least for the time being, by the Advisory Commitee's proposals to amend Rules 701, 702,
and 703, which were approved April 17,2000, and became effective on December 1, 2000.
106. Bone, supra note 5, at 922.
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problems create substantial obstacles for a group so widely
dispersed. Moreover, prospective plaintiffs who have not yet been
injured have little incentive to invest in securing procedural rules
that would benefit them only in the event of serious injury. And
because most plaintiffs are one-shot litigants, even those with
lawsuits pending are not likely to care much about rule reform, as
their suits will probably terminate before any rule change takes
effect.
It is true that there are organized groups that represent plaintiffs.
But those groups tend to focus selectively on particular kinds of
litigation, such as civil rights, and their interests do not necessarily
match the interests of all their constituents. Bar groups, such as the
American Trial Lawyers' Association, represent the interests of
plaintiffs to some extent, but lawyer incentives are sufficiently
different from client incentives that bar groups cannot be trusted
always to represent plaintiffs faithfully. Because of these collective
action problems, therefore, legislative rulemaking is likely to be
plagued by inefficient logrolling '07
Professor Bone's analysis looks only to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The collective action problems become compounded in
the evidence context, where rules are not only expected to be
transubstantive within the civil realm, but also between the civil and
the criminal realms. For example, Congressional efforts to amend
Rules 702 on expert testimony were clearly "stacked" toward the
interests of civil defendants. Commentators were highly critical of a
House bill that was part of the 1992 Republican "Contract With
America" tort reform package; the House bill would have limited the
admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases, but not criminal
cases. 10
Professor Jonathan Macey argues that court rulemaking is no less
distorted by public choice considerations." Professor Bone responds
107. Id. at 922-923.
108. Nancy S. Farrell, Comment, Congressional Action to Amend Federal Rule of
Evidence 702: A Mischievous Attempt to Codify Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 523 (1997); David L. Faigman, Making the
Law Safe for Science: A Proposed Rule for the Admission of Expert Testimony, 35
WASHBURN L.J. 401, 404 (1996) (criticizing the 1995 House Bill [H.R. 988]'s for limiting
scrutiny of scientific evidence to civil cases, thus allowing prosecutors to use "junk
science"). Although H.R. 988 was introduced in the Senate, it was not considered during
the session. Subsequent legislation to amend Rule 702 was reintroduced in both the
House (Alternative Dispute Resolution and Settlement Encouragement Act, H.R. 903,
105th Cong. §4 (1997) and Senate (Civil Justice Fairness Act of 1997, S. 79, 105th Cong. §
302), but no action was taken on these provisions while the Evidence Rules Advisory
Committee drafted amendments to Rules 701, 702 and 703 that were approved by the
Judicial Conference, promulgated by the Supreme Court, and went into effect untouched
by Congress, effective December 2000..
109. Bone, supra note 5, at 923-24 (citing Prof. Jonathan Macey).
that, although some logrolling can be expected because, Congress has
the last word under the Rules Enabling Act,n1 the degree of
inefficiency is much lower under the court rulemaking and should be
far less than under a pure legislative model of rulemaking:
[I]nefficient logrolling is less likely in a court-based rulemaking
process which relies on a committee system. Because the Advisory
Committee has control over a limited range of subject matter, court
rulemaking involves a much narrower policy space and thus a
smaller region over which trades can be made. Moreover, vigorous
logrolling is likely only if rulemakers are strongly allied with
distinct constituencies-an unlikely scenario for a committee
composed mainly of federal judges. To be sure, interest groups can
trade with one another directly. A corporate group, for example,
might agree not to oppose a class action amendment favored by a
civil rights group in return for the civil rights group agreeing not to
oppose a strict sanctions rule. But here too, opportunities for
compromise are limited by the confined policy space as well as by
the more limited opportunities for agenda manipulation."'
Professor Bone concludes that public choice analysis does not,
however, produce a "ringing endorsement" of court rulemaking
because:
The conditions that frustrate logrolling in the committee setting-
rulemaker incentives and a limited policy space that together make
compromise difficult-are also a recipe for stalemate. In addition,
rulemakers who seek to satisfy interest groups will tend to focus on
rules capable of garnering consensus. As we have seen, these rules
often include highly general discretionary standards that give
Professor Macey argues that federal judges will adopt rules that maximize their
private utility, understood as a function of preferences for leisure time, prestige,
and power to make decisions that advance private conceptions of the public
good. Macey predicts that judge-rulemakers with these incentives will support
procedural rules that maximize trial judge control over litigation, because rules of
this sort provide numerous opportunities for advancing judicial self-interest in
individual cases. The resulting procedure, he concludes, is likely to be inefficient
because of externalities.
Id. at 923.
110. Id. at 923 (citing Macey).
[A] public choice analysis should treat court rulemaking as a strategic game
among the Advisory Committee, Congress, and the various interest groups. Self-
interested rulemakers faced with the threat of congressional intervention should
be willing to make concessions to powerful interest groups in order to maintain
some control over the rulemaking process. Thus, interest groups should have
influence over rulemaking, though their influence will be limited by the costs of
successful lobbying in Congress.
Id at 924.
111. Id. at 924-925.
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competing interest groups a chance to wage their battles in
individual suits.
12
Although he sees the committee rulemaking system as flawed,
Professor Bone concludes that it is the best of the procedural
rulemaking options."' Am analysis of the most appropriate
rulemaking process is beyond the scope of this Article, but Professor
Bone's application of the insights of public choice theory to
procedural rules suggests some rather compelling reasons why
Professor Rice should not look to Congress to solve the problems he
identifies.
B. Professor Kenneth Broun: To Codify or Not to Codify (Federal
Privileges)?
Professor Kenneth Broun, an experienced member of the
rulemaking process, discusses a very different problem with federal
rulemaking than the issues raised by Professor Rice. As noted in Part
I of this Article, the law of privilege was left to the federal courts to
develop under the common law system. Professor Broun has
generated an eloquent argument on the many good reasons it may
now be time to codify the federal law of privilege."' However, as
Professor Broun notes, the Rules Enabling Act, as amended,
expressly provides for a unique twist regarding the creation of
privilege law; instead of having the obligation to act affirmatively to
amend or reject rules promulgated by the Advisory Committee, the
Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court, those committees and
the Court serve merely as drafting agents of proposed legislation,
which Congress must then enact. This raises two issues for Professor
Broun: 1) is codification still desirable under this system and 2) if so,
are there lessons to be learned from the past that can aid the process
of this codification?
As discussed in Section A above, Congress has not been good to
the Evidence Rules and this bodes ill for Professor Broun's project.
During the panel discussion, Panelist and former Evidence Rules
Advisory Committee member Gregory P. Joseph expressed a well-
founded concern about opening the door to Congress to codify
privilege law.l 'S He suggested that members of Congress are likely to
stuff the Evidence Rules with privileges favored by all sorts of special
112. Id. at 925.
113. Id. at 925-26. He suggests clarifying the norms underpinning the rulemaking
process as a means to developing professional standards to guide rulemaking in the future.
Id.
114. Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance-Testimonial Privileges
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J 769 (2002).
115. Transcript, supra note 102, at 755.
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interest groups. Although there are probabl!y worse things than
creating an "aromatherapist-client" privilege" at the urging of a
particular special interest group, one can reasonably ask whether we
would be better off with a federal common law of privilege? Should
we just leave the development of privilege law to "be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience?"" 7
The question of a common law formulation versus a codification
of evidence law is an old one, dating back to the earliest efforts at
codifying American evidence law."' However, the essential problem
is, as Professors Wright and Graham noted, a Catch-22: "If the rules
were advocated because they would change the law, then opponents
would object to the changes; if the reformers insisted the Rules simply
restated the existing law, the other side replied: then who needs
them?""' 9 Professor Broun's codification project will face the same
objections. Will a code of privilege law actually present fewer bases
for interpretation, argument, and the resulting uncertainty?
Although codification offers the chance for clarity and uniformity,
could not well-drafted federal judicial opinions offer the same
benefits?
There is no question that the common law rulemaking process
moves even more slowly and conservatively than the rule-amendment
process, but there have been strong arguments made that the
rulemaking process should move slowly.' Indeed, although
Professor Rice believes that the rulemaking process moves too slowly,
some have argued that it is moving too fast.! Moreover, there will be
an uphill battle to counter Professor Capra's point regarding rule
amendments: "If the courts are surviving with [a] rule as they appear
to be, however unhappily, the benefits of a rule change are unlikely to
outweigh the costs. This is not to speak of the costs of upsetting
settled expectations that come with any rule change." '12 Professor
Broun argues that codification is especially important in the context
of privilege law because the certainty and predictability of a code
116. Id
117. FED. R. EVID. 501.
118. The title of this section is a variation on Barbara Salken's fine history of New
York's efforts to break away from a common law system of evidence. Barbara C. Salken,
To Codify or Not to Codify-That Is The Question: A Study of New York's Efforts to
Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 641 (1992).
119. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5005, at 92.
120. Capra, Case Law Divergence, supra note 77, at 531.
121. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5009, at 11 n.13 (Supp. 2001) (observing
that amendments to the Evidence Rules are coming along as often as the swallows to
Capistrano).
122. Capra, Congress and The Federal Rules of Evidence, supra note 91, at 702.
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supports the societal value of confidentiality underlying most
privileges." He notes that: "The more predictable one's entitlement
to privac is, the more secure one can feel in exercising that
privacy. 117 If, as Professor Broun points out, Congress "likes
privileges, better than do the courts,"' and is ready to listen to its
constituents on proposed specific privileges,26 we might expect that
changes to privilege law could happen far more often than is
advisable given the costs of unsettled expectations and
unpredictability.
On the positive side, it is possible that public choice theory would
support the privilege codification project, whereas it does not tend to
support the efficiency of judicial rulemaking through the Rules
Enabling Act process. As Professor Broun notes, privilege rules
would have to be passed and amended as most other types of
legislation because of the requirements of the Rules Enabling Act."
Thus, the awkward three-way dance among Congress, the Judicial
Conference, and interest groups, which contribute to the inefficiency
of judicial rulemaking, is eliminated when the judiciary's power is
taken out of the equation, except as potential drafters of proposed
legislation. Moreover, the wide range of substantive interests
reflected by privilege law allow for far more effective Congressional
"logrolling" of conflicting interests.
1
2
Nevertheless, despite many of these same issues and objections,
the Federal Rules of Evidence were eventually and successfully
codified. The problems noted above with the privilege codification
project are not insurmountable, practically or politically. One of the
key components of its success, however, is the stewardship of
someone like Professor Broun, who not only has the scholarly
intellect to accomplish the project but also has substantial experience
in the rulemaking context, adding the power of his personal
experience to the mix. For example, contrast his approach in the
article in this issue of the Hastings Law Journal-a modest and solid
argument that it is time to build on the strengths of the previous
treatment of federal privilege law while avoiding the pitfalls of the
last effort at codification-with Professor Morgan's announcement to
the Bar of the "radical" reform posed by the Model Code. 9 Like
Professor Capra, Professor Broun understands that he must softly
123. Broun, supra note 114, at 797.
124. Id. at 798
125. Id. at 778
126. Id.
127. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 2074.
128. Bone, supra note 5, at 922.
129. Ladd, supra note 103.
"pitch" reform-not shove it down the throat of the decision-
makers."3 Professor Broun understands the constraints of his role
and has floated this proposal for codification to test the waters. He is
the right person for the job, even if the job is a difficult and thankless
task.
C. Gregory P. Joseph: Are the Evidence Rules Especially Substantive
Rules of Procedure?
Panelist, former Evidence Rules Advisory Committee member,
litigator, and trial lawyer Gregory P. Joseph argued that the Evidence
Rules have drawn more flak than other rules of procedure, probably
because the Evidence Rules are more substantive than other
procedural rules. Mr. Joseph suggested that even some rules, such as
Rule 407, which prohibits evidence of subsequent remedial measures
when offered to prove negligence, are not concerned with the law of
privilege. He pointed out that the Evidence Rules are heavily
outcome-determinative and do, in fact, affect substantial rights of
litigants.' Thus, the Advisory Committee is simply not going to jump
at every chance to amend the Evidence Rules, and alter or upset
those expectations. He stressed that the Advisory Committee takes
the limitations imposed by the Rules Enabling Act responsibility
quite seriously." This process of careful deliberation bears out
Professor Ronan E. Degnan's suggestion that the federal courts have
upheld the validity of the federal rules not "because wise men made
them, but because wise men thought carefully before making them."'33
As discussed in Part I of this article, it was in part concern over
the legitimacy of the proposed Evidence Rules under the Rules
Enabling Act that led to Congress's intervention and affirmative
adoption of the original Evidence Rules as legislation. Professors
Wright and Graham suggest that had the Evidence Rules been
adopted through the Rules Enabling Act process, they would have
been susceptible to challenge on whether they exceeded the authority
of that statute."4 This is due to the special substantive quality of rules
130. Broun, supra note 114.
131. Transcript, supra note 102, at 750-51.
132. Id. at 750.
133. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 406
(6th ed. 2002) [hereinafter LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS].
134. Justice Douglas dissented from the Supreme Court's transmittal of the proposed
Evidence Rules on the grounds that the rules were beyond the Court's rulemaking power.
See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5006, at 104, 109 n.96 ("If the Rules had been
adopted by the Supreme Court, they would be open to challenge on whether they
exceeded the Enabling Act."). See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) ("Since they
were adopted by Congress, they can only be attacked on constitutional grounds."). Where
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
ANALYZING THE POLITICS OF RULEMAKING
of evidence. Indeed, there are cases holding that a state rule of
evidence, rather than the federal Evidence Rule, must be applied in a
federal court sitting under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction because
of countervailing state substantive policies." These cases may be
open to criticism under the Supreme Court's decision in Hanna v.
Plumer, holding that where an arguably procedural federal rule is in
direct conflict with a state rule of procedure, the federal rule must be
applied unless the federal rule is unconstitutional. '36 Professors
Wright, Miller, and Cooper take a rather black or white approach to
the problem, stating that:
The Evidence Rules are not subject to the Rules of Decision Act or
(unlike the Rules of Civil Procedure) to the Rules Enabling Act.
Their validity is governed solely by the Constitution, but since all of
the Rules of Evidence can be viewed rationally as rules of
procedure (the constitutional standard announced in Hanna v.
Plumer), they all clearly are constitutional.37
This statement is correct as far as the original "package" of
Evidence Rules goes. However, several Evidence Rules, including
Rule 407, have been amended pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act
process since the rules were originally legislated by Congress. If these
amendments are viewed as encroaching on significant state
substantive policies, their validity may not be as clear. Moreover, the
treatise authors note that sometimes there is ambiguity as to whether
a federal rule conflicts with the state rule:
potential tension between federal and state policy appeared especially strong, Congress
specifically stated that state evidence law should apply on presumptions (Rule 302),
privilege (Rule 501), and competency (Rule 601) when state law provided the rules for
decision.
135. See Hottle v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that in a
products liability action, defendant's internal manuals were properly excluded under
Virginia evidence law even though the manuals would be admissible under the Federal
evidence rules); Carota v. Johns Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that
Massachusetts rule authorizing the admissibility of evidence of out-of-court settlements is
substantive and thus must be applied over the contrasting approach of FED. R. EVID. 408).
See also Milbrand v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Tex. 2000)
(holding, on an issue of first impression, that Texas statute prohibiting defendant from
introducing evidence of seat belt nonuse in civil trials is substantive, rather than
procedural, and thus, must be applied in diversity case; granting plaintiff's motion to strike
testimony of defense expert on consequences of nonuse of seat belt; evidence of nonuse of
seat belt by driver was not admissible even for limited purpose of proving causation or
negating proximate cause); Morton v. Brockman, 184 F.R.D. 211 (D. Me. 1999) (holding
that Maine statute excluding evidence of nonuse of seat belts is substantive, not
procedural, and applies in diversity cases over relevant federal evidentiary rules).
136. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
137. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FED.
PRAc. & PROC. JURIs. 2d § 4512 (1996 & Supp. 2002) (citations omitted).
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the decision between state and federal evidence rules in diversity
cases is more complicated when no Federal Rule of Evidence
explicitly addresses the issue at hand. For instance, when state law
would exclude evidence that the Federal Rules would admit it is
more difficult to identify a controlling provision of federal law.1
The treatise concludes that Rule 402, the general principle that
all relevant evidence is admissible unless the Constitution, an Act of
Congress, or a rule of procedure excludes the evidence, is such a
controlling provision and should be applied rather than a state
evidence rule.139 However, the treatise also acknowledges the broad
and general scope of Rule 40;.140 It seems plausible that if faced with
a diversity of citizenship action in which there is a state evidence rule
on point embodying a substantial state policy, as well as a very
general federal rule, a federal court might find a way to apply the
state evidence rule-whether it argues that it must (under Erie or
Hanna) or it argues that it makes good sense to do so, given concerns
for federalism.
The special "substantive" quality of the Evidence Rules,
however, suggests a slightly different question: if there are limits to
what the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference and the
Supreme Court can do in terms of creating and amending the
Evidence Rules, are there limits to what Congress can do in directly
legislating such rules? The only limit appears to be the Constitution,
but it is hornbook law that a rule of procedure, properly enacted
under the Rules Enabling Act, has never been held unconstitutional.
But this could change. It is also hornbook law that "neither
Congress nor the federal courts can, under the guise of formulating
rules of decision for the federal courts, fashion rules which are not
supported by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or
some other section of the Constitution; in such areas state law must
govern because there can be no other law." ' We may have seen a
sneak preview of problems to come. In 1994, the Advisory
Committee drafted an amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 412,
commonly called "the Rape Shield statute," which precludes the
admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct by a sexual assault
complainant except under certain conditions and certain procedural
safeguards. The 1994 amendment applied the exclusionary provisions
of Rule 412 in civil cases, as well as criminal cases. 4 Rule 412 was not




141. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72.
142. FED. R. EvID. 412(a), (b)(2), advisory committee's notes.
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and was directly enacted by Congress in 1978, three years after the
original rules went into effect. Although the amendment extending
Rule 412 to civil cases was approved by the Standing Committee and
the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court refused to transmit it to
Congress, stating that it feared the provision would alter the
substantive rights of litigants. Congress nevertheless reinserted the
provision as drafted by the Advisory Committee as part of the
Violent Crime Bill. '43 Thus, the Supreme Court dodged the question
of whether the provision was within its powers under the Rules
Enabling Act. But what is the constitutional ground upon which
Congress could enact a provision such as Rule 412? If the rule is so
substantive that the Supreme Court believes it would not have the
power to promulgate it as a rule of procedure, can it really be said to
be "Necessary and Proper"' 44 to carry out Congress's power to "To
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court? 1 45 Does Article
III, § 2, which gives the federal courts the power to hear cases
between citizens of different states, also carry the power to determine
the rules of evidence that apply in those cases? Or is this the kind of
substantive provision, unjustifiable under an enumerated
constitutional power, that is "reserved to the States" under the tenth
amendment? The Supreme Court has been focused on the
constitutionality of its own conduct since its decision in Erie Railroad
Company v. Tompkins. If Congress gets carried away in its
enthusiasm to directly enact rules of evidence that are "especially
substantive," perhaps the Court will be willing to scrutinize the
constitutional basis for such legislation. But then again, maybe not.
In the meantime, Mr. Joseph's comments raise a legitimate and
serious rationale for the Advisory Committee's preference to act
slowly and cautiously in altering any of the Evidence Rules.
D. Laird Kirkpatrick: Problems of "Representation" in the Rulemaking
Process
Professor Laird Kirkpatrick provided powerful insights into
problems of "representation" in the rulemaking process. As a former
representative of the Department of Justice to the Evidence Rules
Advisory Committee, he understood that representation does not
necessarily come with the luxury of speaking with one voice on behalf
of one's constituency. Professor Kirkpatrick revealed substantial
division of opinion in the Department of Justice on various issues
before the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee. Although the study
143. Violent Crime Bill of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-322, § 40141(b), 108 Stat. 1919 (1994).
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
145. Id.
of the rulemaking process tends to focus on the Advisory Committee,
the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court and the Congress, we
tend to forget that the Executive Branch has a strong voice, but it can
be muffled by internal conflicts over proposed rules or amendments.
The history of the Evidence Rules reveals that the Department of
Justice has had a very powerful influence on the development of the
Rules, one that is likely to continue, given the Department's
significant amount of civil and criminal litigation.
E. Judge Fern Smith: The Buck Stops Here With a Trial Judge
Judge Smith, a former member and Chair of the Evidence Rules
Advisory Committee, was an interesting figure on the panel. No one
on the panel, even veteran trial lawyer Greg Joseph, has participated
in more trials or dealt with more evidence issues than Judge Smith,
who has served as a trial judge on the California Superior Court and
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. She embodies the kind of intelligence, balance and
practicality that one hopes to find in the judiciary, both federal and
state.
Trial judges are the infantry soldiers of the judiciary. They tend
to be predominantly cautious, conservative-preferring to follow
orders rather than striking out on their own. They are on the front
lines, dealing with new and unforseen problems before anyone else
has an opportunity to think them through.146 But they are grounded
in realities of modern life-and in court, that means the need to
render speedy but fair evidentiary rulings, even when the Evidence
Rules are not perfect.
Judge Smith is certainly not a "Hippie" (or the modern day
equivalent-a "crit," I suppose), but nor is she a judge out of the "law
as a brooding omnipresence" school of legal formalism. She is a
realist. She is from the Hart & Sacks Legal Process school of
"reasoned elaboration."'1 7  Adherents of "reasoned elaboration"
understood that the application of a general legal principle, embodied
in a rule or statute, meant negotiating the path between "the rigors of
a perfected rule, on the one hand, and the looseness of unbuttoned
146. I have a former colleague, who shall go unnamed for his protection, who always
advises his students to aim for federal appellate clerkships. He promises the thrill and
excitement of working on "the cutting edge of the law." He has never satisfactorily
responded to my observation that trial judges work on "the cutting edge." Courts of
appeal at least have the trial court's solution to the problem to ponder.
147. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 161 (tent. ed. Cambridge, Mass.,
private printing, 1958).
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discretion, on the other."' In declining to endorse a slavish
adherence to the "plain meaning" approach to interpreting evidence
rules, Judge Smith acknowledged that English, even the carefully
considered language of the Evidence Rules, is 
seldom plain."9
However, she also consistently stressed the importance of avoiding
the creation of additional interpretative problems by altering the
language of rules-unless there is a demonstrated need for change
and a practical solution to be found.5 In other words, when Judge
Smith argues, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it," I do not understand her
to say, as some apparently do, that she thinks the Evidence Rules are
perfect as they are. I understand her to say that perfection is not the
point (except, perhaps, in the eyes of law professors). I hear her say
that the goal of the evidence rulemaking process is to produce a
reasonably clear set of Evidence Rules that can generally be applied
with some flexibility but with as little confusion and as much
consistency as is possible in the human and imperfect world of the
trial.
In order to allow a trial judge such as Judge Smith to do her job,
Professors Hart and Sacks argued, she must be given ample
discretion. "Discretion is a vehicle of good far more than of evil. It is
the only means by which the intelligence and good will of a society
can be brought to bear directly on the solution of hitherto unsolved
problems."" She understands that the drafters of the Evidence Rules
built a substantial amount of discretion into those rules in order to
"empower," in the cliche of today's world, trial judges to deal with the
new or unforeseen or case-specific problems they encounter."2 The
job function of the trial judge is to use that discretion wisely.
And Congress needs to let trial judges do their jobs without
undue interference. However, there is a disturbing development in
the politics of evidence law that needs to be discredited if trial judges
are permitted to use their discretion properly. Federal courts are well
into the struggle to apply new Evidence Rules 413-415, which permit
the admission of evidence of a defendant's prior sexual conduct, for
any purpose, in criminal sexual assault and child molestation cases
and in civil cases raising such allegations. For a time, there was some
question whether Rules 413-415 mandated the admissibility of this
evidence, or whether it is subject to exclusion under Rule 403, when
148. Id at 162.
149. See Transcript, supra note 102 at 767.
150. Id. at 767-68.
151. HART & SACKS, supra note 147, at 179.
152. Ariens, supra note 34, at 252-53 (arguing that reasoned elaboration, as the
jurisprudential basis for the Federal Rules of Evidence, led the drafters to endow the trial
judge with substantial discretion).
"the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by
the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."' All of the courts
that have considered this issue, have held that evidence falling under
Rule 413-415 may be excluded under Rule 403.'-4
Nevertheless, there is a highly disturbing trend among the courts
of appeal to question whether Rule 403 should be applied "liberally"
to give effect to the strong congressional intent in Rules 413-415 to
allow evidence of a defendant's prior sexual conduct. 55
One of the most recent and dramatic cases suggesting that Rule
403 should be applied differently when evidence is offered under
Rules 413-415 is Johnson v. Elk Lake School District.56 In this
opinion by the Chief Judge of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
Edward R. Becker, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding evidence of an alleged prior sexual assault by
the defendant.' The plaintiff, a former high school student, sued her
former guidance counselor and the school administration under §
1983 and state tort law for allegedly sexually harassing and abusing
her."' At the trial against the counselor, plaintiff attempted to offer
testimony from a former co-worker of the counselor. She would have
testified that on one occasion, the counselor had picked her up,
thrown her over his shoulder, and put his hand up her skirt, touching
153. FED. R. EVID. 403
154. See, e.g., Doe by Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1268 (9th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting claim that Rule 415, which allows for introduction of prior sexual misconduct in
civil sexual assault or child molestation cases, eliminates balancing protections of Rule
403); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1430-35 (10th Cir. 1998) (Rule 403 applies to
evidence offered under Rule 413); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 605-606 (2d Cir.
1997) (Rule 403 applies to evidence offered under Rule 414).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997) ("the
courts are to 'liberally' admit evidence of prior uncharged sex offenses" under Rule 414;
holding that based on legislative history, "there is no time limit beyond which prior sex
offenses by a defendant are inadmissible") (citations to legislative history omitted); United
States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 768 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing, as an abuse of discretion,
district court's decision under Rule 403 to exclude evidence of prior sexual conduct by
defendant, "to give effect to the decision of Congress, expressed in recently enacted Rule
414, to loosen to a substantial degree the restrictions of prior law on the admissibility of
such evidence"); United States v. Withorn, 204 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that
"the district court was obligated to take into account Congress's policy judgment that Rule
413 was 'justified by the distinctive characteristics of the cases it will affect,' and that Rule
414 evidence is 'exceptionally probative' of a defendant's sexual interest in children").
156. 283 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2002).
157. Id. at 159.
158. Id. at 144.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
April 2002] ANALYZING THE POLITICS OF RULEMAKING 877
her crotch.159 The district court judge expressed concern that there
was insufficient evidence that this prior act was intentional, which
would be required to make it "an offense of sexual assault" under
state law, thus making Rules 413(d) and 415 applicable) 6° Rule 415
makes admissible in a civil case evidence of "a party's commission of
another offense or offenses of sexual assault" as defined under Rule
413(d). Despite the district court's statements on the record about
whether the prior conduct alleged would fall under the definition of a
"sexual assault," the court of appeals concluded "that what the Court
really did was to engage in a kind of balancing exercise" under Rule
403.'
The court of appeals then engaged in an extensive discussion of
the standards that apply when evidence is offered under Rules 413-
415. After examining the legislative history of these rules, the court
of appeals concluded that the trial court "may admit the evidence so
long as it is satisfied that the evidence is relevant, with relevancy
determined by whether a jury could reasonably conclude by a
preponderance of the evidence that the past act was a sexual assault
and that it was committed by the defendant" under Rule 104(b),
following the United States Supreme Court decision in Huddleston v.
United States.62 In a rather unusual argument, the court of appeals
used, as evidence of legislative intent to follow Huddleston in
interpreting Rules 413-415, a speech by David J. Karp, then a
Department of Justice official and the author of Rules 413-415,
delivered at the annual AALS Evidence Section meeting and later
reprinted in a law journal! 63 The court of appeals concluded that this
speech/law review article could serve as legislative history because
Representative Susan Molinari and Senator Robert Dole, the
principle sponsors of Rules 413-415, "declared in their floor
statements supporting the new rules" that the speech/law review
article "was to serve as an 'authoritative' part of the Rules' legislative
history.'6 However, the court of appeals concluded that because the
159. Id. at 149.
160. Id. at 150.
161. Id.
162. 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988).
163. Johnson, 283 F.3d at 154-55 (citing David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and
Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L.REv. 15 (1994)). At
the time he delivered his talk, Karp was then Senior Counsel at the Office of Policy
Development at the Department of Justice. LL at 150.
164. Id at 154 (citing 140 CONG. REC. 23,602 (1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari); 140
CONG. REC. 24,799 (1994) (statement of Sen. Dole)). Chief Judge Becker noted that
while "relying on the work of a non-legislator is a somewhat unusual method of
establishing legislative history, it is not entirely unknown." Id. at 155 n.10. He cited two
other instances, where law review articles have been used both as the basis for and to
district court had apparently decided to exclude the evidence of the
prior act offered in this case under Rule 403 (even though the trial
court never mentioned Rule 403, let alone Huddleston), the trial court
properly dispensed with the Huddleston analysis.
But the court of appeals went further. Because he concluded
that the district court had apparently ruled on Rule 403 grounds,
Chief Judge Becker took the opportunity to set forth the appropriate
approach a trial court should take in applying Rule 403 to Rules 413-
415. He again turned to David Karp's speech/law review article "as
part of the 'authoritative' legislative history of Rules 413-15. '166 He
cited Karp's work as evidence that when evidence is offered under
Rules 413-415, Congress intended that the probative value of the
evidence should normally not be outweighed by the considerations
listed in Rule 403.167 However, Chief Judge Becker went on to refine
Karp's analysis, because "in our view, this characterization of the role
of Rule 403 is overly simplified.""" Chief Judge Becker concluded
that in some cases, evidence offered under Rules 413-415 is entitled to
a presumption of admissibility, but in other cases, it is not:
We think that in cases where the past act is demonstrated with
specificity and is substantially similar to the act(s) for which the
defendant is being sued, it is Congress's intent that the probative
value of the similar act be presumed to outweigh Rule 403's
concerns. In a case such as this one, however, in which the
evidence of the past act of sexual offense is equivocal and the past
act differs from the charged act in important ways, we believe that
no presumption in favor of admissibility is in order, and that the
trial court retains significant authority to exclude the proffered
evidence under Rule 403.169
Chief Judge Becker concluded that this case, in which he
repeatedly quotes the district court as expressing doubt about
whether the prior act could even qualify as a "sexual assault" under
Rules 413 and 415,170 is not a case where a presumption of
admissibility should apply because the evidence regarding the prior
construe legislation. Id. He acknowledged, however, that the other instances were not
cases where the articles were deemed "an 'authoritative' part of the legislative history," as
was done with Rules 413-415. Id. While every author of a law review article undoubtedly
wishes to be influential (or at least read), I suspect it is beyond the wildest dreams of most
authors to be "authoritative" in the sense of having the first and last word on the meaning
of a piece of legislation.
165. Id. at 157.
166. Id. at 155.
167. Id. at 156.
168. Id.
169. IL at 144.
170. Id. at 158 n.17.
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incident was "equivocal" and because the alleged prior assault
differed from the alleged assault in the case at hand in at least three
different ways.'7' Thus, he concluded, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding testimony about the alleged prior assault."
I am hesitant to criticize an opinion by a judge as experienced
and knowledgeable about the law of evidence as Chief Judge Edward
R. Becker, who has done more perhaps than any other federal judge
to reform the law of evidence. 3 Nonetheless, the Johnson opinion is
very troublesome because it diminishes the trial court's exercise of
discretion under Rule 403 at the same time it purports to respect and
uphold that discretion by discussing a "presumption" of admissibility
of Rule 413-415 evidence that was not even at issue under the facts as
discussed by the court of appeals. 4 The Johnson opinion has done
serious damage to the power of the trial court to weigh the individual
circumstances of particular cases before it. Chief Judge Becker's
refinement of Karp's proposal (arguing for a "presumption" of
admissibility only in certain cases) demonstrates that Karp's analysis
was not "authoritative," in the sense of "binding" on the court of
appeals. The Chief Judge's analysis of the application of the
171. Id. at 158.
172. Id. at 159.
173. A star-studded group of evidence scholars recently paid tribute to Chief Judge
Becker's opinions and contributions to the law of federal evidence. See Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Edward J. Imwinkelried, & Daniel J. Capra, Keeping the Reformist Spirit Alive
in Evidence Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1277 (2001) (tribute to Judge Edward R. Becker).
174. The bulk of the discussion on Rules 413-415 is dicta, and, as argued further below,
is not helpful dicta. Chief Judge Becker explicitly stated that he read the trial court as
relying on Rule 403, in excluding the evidence, which made it unnecessary for the trial
court to engage in the Huddleston analysis: "Although the [District] Court did not say so
explicitly, it appears to us that the Court concluded that Radwanski's testimony did not
satisfy Rule 403, and it accordingly-and appropriately-bypassed the Huddleston
reasonable jury determination." Id. at 157. Moreover, because the Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial court that the alleged prior act and the act under dispute in the case
were dissimilar in several ways, and that the proof of the prior act was "equivocal," the
Court of Appeals had a substantial basis for holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the evidence of the prior act. Id. at 157-58. Thus, Chief Judge
Becker's entire discussion of the Congressional intent to create a "presumption" of
admissibility under Rule 403 when sufficient evidence of similar acts is offered under
Rules 413-415 is also unnecessary dicta. I do not mean to suggest that dicta is always bad;
I am a firm believer that courts sometimes need to discuss issues outside the precise facts
before them, whether to strengthen their arguments or to provide guidance, as Chief
Judge Becker suggested he was doing here. Indeed, my study of legal argumentation and
persuasion would be impossible if all dicta were banned! However, the Johnson dicta is
especially harmful because it ranges so widely and, due to Chief Judge Becker's special
credibility on evidentiary issues, may be given the status of law. Although ordinarily I
agree and admire the Chief Judge's opinions on evidence, I argue here that his
interpretation of Rule 403's application to Rules 413-415 is very problematic.
Huddleston standard implied that, although he would have preferred
a different rule (Rule 104(a) rather than Rule 104(b)), he had little
choice but to accept Karp's views.'75 Although I agree with Chief
Judge Becker that the legislative history shows that Karp and the
main sponsors of Rules 413-415 wanted to remove as many obstacles
to the admissibility of this evidence as possible, I do not agree that
Chief Judge Becker was bound to follow that secondary interpretative
material, if he could make a sound argument-as he did-that there
are serious problems with such an approach. Putting aside the
question of whether any kind of legislative history, let alone a law
review article based on a convention talk, is "authoritative" rather
than merely "persuasive,' ' 6 Chief Judge Becker's analysis also
ignored the express limitation of subsection (c) in the text of each of
Rules 413-415; subsection (c) is identical in each rule, providing that
the rule "shall not be construed to limit the admission or
consideration of the evidence under any other rule.'77 The Chief
Judge needed to explain why the legislative history deserved more
weight than the text of Rules 413-415 themselves.
Moreover, it simply makes no sense to speak of a presumption of
admissibility when Rule 403 is applied to evidence being considered
under Rules 413-415. Rule 403 is already "tilted" in favor of
admissibility; there is no need to graft on an additional
"Congressional" presumption of admissibility in the context of Rules
413-415. Rule 403 specifically states that the evidence, whether
offered under Rules 413-415 or otherwise, "may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed"'7 by the dangers listed
under Rule 403. The word "substantially" tilts the balance of Rule
403 toward admissibility. The drafters of the 1990 amendment to
Rule 609(a)(1) understood this when they altered the rule to create
two balancing tests. 9 As with Rules 413-415, evidence of a prior
conviction used to impeach a witness is inherently prejudicial-there
175. Id. at 154.
176. The question of "persuasive" legislative history is discussed in Eileen A. Scallen,
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee
Notes, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1283 (1995).
177. FED. R. EVID. 413(c), 414(c), 415(c) (emphasis added).
178. FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added).
179. The 1990 amendment was made to cure the ambiguity under former Rule 609,
which was raised in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Company, 490 U.S. 504 (1989). In
that case, the plaintiff was a prisoner in a work-release project who was injured on the job.
He brought a products liability action against the manufacturer of a dryer, but was
impeached with his prior felony convictions because the prior version of Rule 609 only
permitted balancing when the conviction was offered to impeach "the defendant." If the
case arose today, the plaintiff's prior conviction would be balanced under Rule 403,
because he was a witness "other than the accused."
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is a danger that the jury will make a decision based solely on past acts
rather than on the evidence in the case at hand. However, ordinary
Rule 403 balancing applies when the witness to be impeached with a
prior conviction is not the accused in a criminal action. A more
protective balancing test applies to criminal defendants who take the
stand; a prior conviction (of the sufficient seriousness) can only be
used to impeach the accused if the probative value of the conviction
outweighs its prejudicial effect.'s
If Congress truly intended a special balancing rule for evidence
offered under Rules 413-415, it could have said so. If Congress
intended for evidence to be admissible under Rules 413-415
regardless of Rule 403, it could have said so. But Congress did
nothing in Rules 413-415 to alter the normal application and
interpretation of Rule 403. If, on reviewing the subsequent treatment
of evidence offered under Rules 413-415, Congress believes the
federal courts are not admitting this evidence when they should, I
have no doubt that Congress will change the application of Rule 403.
Other appellate courts have also attempted to set forth
guidelines for trial courts to consider in applying Rule 403 to evidence
of prior sexual misconduct by a defendant. There is a palpable
difference between these cases, however, and cases such as Johnson,
in which the appellate court actually attempts to apply Rule 403
balancing on behalf of the district court.8  In United States v.
LeMay," the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held
that evidence of prior sexual misconduct admitted under Rule 414 did
not violate the defendant's fundamental right of due process where
the district court applied the Rule 403 balancing test
"conscientiously" and on the record so as to permit "meaningful
appellate review."" The court set forth a number of factors that a
180. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (balancing tests apply "if the crime was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted"). Cf. United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
842 (1983) (no balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect is allowed when a
conviction for a crime of "dishonesty or false statement" is offered under Rule 609(a)(2)).
181. See also United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
that: "In light of the strong legislative judgment that evidence of prior sexual offenses
should ordinarily be admissible, we think the District Court erred in its assessment that
the probative value of [evidence of an alleged prior act of misconduct by the defendant]
was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."). The appellate court
reversed the District Court for an abuse of discretion in applying Rule 403, despite the
trial court's record of balancing the lack of similarity between the prior act and the
charged offense and the remoteness and unfair prejudice of the other act. Id at 770.
182. 260 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1181 (2002).
183. Id at 1022. Accord United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998)
("application of Rule 403 to Rule 414 evidence eliminates the due process concerns posed
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trial court must consider when gutting Rule 413-415 evidence under
the "microscope" of Rule 403. Relying on its earlier decision in
Doe by Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer,' the LeMay court listed the
following considerations:
(1) "the similarity of the prior acts to the acts charged," (2) the"closeness in time of the prior acts to the acts charged," (3) "the
frequency of the prior acts," (4) the "presence or lack of
intervening circumstances," and (5) "the necessity of the evidence
beyond the testimonies already offered at trial." We also stated
that this list of factors is not exclusive, and that district judges
should consider other factors relevant to individual cases.l
6
Because the Ninth Circuit had not decided Glanzer at the time of
LeMay's trial, the appellate court carefully reviewed the factors
considered by the trial judge and concluded that "the record reveals
that he exercised his discretion to admit the evidence in a careful and
judicious manner. ' 187
It is true that evidence of a party's prior sexual misconduct will
generally be abhorrent to the average juror and may tempt the juror
to decide the case at hand on improper grounds-such as raw
emotion or a desire to avenge past acts-rather than on the evidence
in the case at hand. These, of course, are only some of the reasons
why members of the federal judiciary, bar, and legal academy fought
so hard against Rules 413-415. Nonetheless, Rules 413-415 are now
the law. But this does not mean that those Rules are entitled to
special treatment under Rule 403. "Dangerous," "misleading,"
"confusing," or "time-consuming" evidence offered under Rules 413-
415 may be excluded under Rule 403 only when it "substantially
outweighs" the probative value of such evidence, which the
proponents of Rules 413-415 suggest is generally significant. The
crucial point is that this is the kind of case-specific, fact-intensive
balancing process that the drafters of Rule 403 thought should be left
to the one impartial expert in the courtroom-the trial judge. While
he agreed with the LeMay majority's holding that Rule 403 balancing
should apply to Rules 413-415, Judge Paez dissented from the
majority's holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
by Rule 414"). See also United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1430-35 (10th Cir. 1998)
(Rule 413 is constitutional if Rule 403 protection stays in place); United States v. Mound,
149 F.3d 799, 800-802 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Wright, 53 MJ. 476 (C.A.A.F.
2000).
184. LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1027.
185. 232 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2000).
186. LeMay, 260 F.3d. at 1028 (quoting Doe by Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d
1258, 1268 (9th Cir. 2000) and citing United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th
Cir. 1998)).
187. Id. at 1028-30.
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admitting evidence of a prior act of sexual misconduct, reminding the
majority of the limited role of the appellate court in reviewing
evidentiary decisions:
Although the majority undertakes a thoughtful Rule 403 analysis, I
believe that decision is better suited to the district court. Appellate
courts have long recognized that we should give great deference to
the evidentiary decisions of district courts. "The trial court in the
exercise of its discretion is more competent to judge the exigencies
of a particular case." (citation omitted) In this case, the district
court is in a far better position than we to assess the intangibles that
are not conveyed well by a cold transcript: the persuasiveness of
the young victims' testimony; the success of defense counsel's
efforts to undermine their credibility; and the probative value the
presentation of prior conviction would have had in the absence of
the mother's testimony.1t
Judge Paez argued that the appellate court should have reversed and
remanded the case so that the trial court could consider and balance
the Glanzer factors on the record.1"
Finally, the life-tenure of federal judges provides a powerful
reason why appellate courts should not usurp the trial court's
discretion under Rule 403 by recognizing a "presumption" of
admissibility under Rules 413-415, even if it applies only in some
cases.' 90 By not creating a special balancing test for Rules 413-415 or
prohibiting the application of Rule 403 balancing, it is plausible that
members of Congress realized that federal district court judges, who
do not have to run for re-election, would retain the discretion to make
the hard calls-the decisions to exclude evidence in situations where
it will be politically unpopular, but legally and practically correct to
do so. Congress did its work in passing Rules 413-415. The appellate
courts should respect the discretion of trial judges such as Judge Fern
Smith, leaving them alone to do what they do best.
Conclusion
The topic of "rulemaking" connotes a civilized discussion of
neutral principles. The topic of "politics" connotes a contentious and
vigorous battle between policy choices and personal perspectives.
The 2002 AALS Evidence Section panel on "The Politics of
188. Id.. at 1034 (Paez, J., concurring and dissenting).
189. Id.
190. In Johnson, Chief Judge Becker argued that this presumption would apply only
"where the past act is demonstrated with specificity and is substantially similar to the
act(s) for which the defendant is being sued." Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d
138, 144 (3d Cir. 2002). Moreover, he recognized that "a policy of mandatory admission,
particularly in the criminal context, has been thought to raise serious constitutional
concerns under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 155 n.12 (citations omitted).
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[Evidence] Rulemaking" captured, in my biased view, the best of
both terms. The panelists vigorously disagreed on several points,
based on personal or professional experience, philosophy, and policy
preferences. Nonetheless, as willing as they were to engage each
other in pointed discussion, the panelists maintained their civility: no
blows were struck, no chairs were tossed, no "Jerry Springer"
bouncers were required.
In listening to (or reading) the panel discussion, one sees that the
process of confrontation-the heart of the adversary system for which
the Evidence Rules were designed-does not need to be a destructive
process and may have value independent of producing some kind of
universal and objective "truth." I seriously doubt that any of the
participants were persuaded by their opponent(s). I also doubt that
many of the audience members were moved from the positions that
led them to attend this particular panel. Nonetheless, the fact that
these panelists took the time to put forth their critical differences in a
public forum demonstrates respect for the rulemaking process in
which they are involved. It is always easier to decline to speak, to
walk away rather than to confront your opponent(s). No matter what
substantive conclusions one draws from analyzing "The Politics of
[Evidence] Rulemaking," one must concede that the participants in
the process are first-class.
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